Introduction
The software industry is experiencing a major delocalization trend, from developed to developing countries (LDCs). In this trend, multinational enterprises (MNEs) from both developed and developing countries are playing a major role. In the 1980s and 1990s, India took the lead in fostering this industry, thanks to its large pool of skilled low cost labor. Ireland and Israel followed suit. Since 2000, China and other LDCs have been entering this fast-growing sector, but questions remain as to how these countries can compete with India, or whether they even have to. In this article, we have chosen to study and compare two significant LDCs that present very different software industries-one emerged, India, and one emerging, China. We examine both the differences and similarities of the growth and internationalization strategies of these two cases, to better inform theory on how developing country MNEs internationalize, and ultimately, compete. The rest of this section summarizes the literature on the global software industry, its relevance to developing country industrialization, and the place of India and China in this sector. The second section recalls some contributions to the theory of the MNE, and derives hypotheses from these perspectives as well as from the existing literature on software industries in India and China. In the third section, the article provides a discussion of India and China's MNE software sectors based on a combination of interviews and secondary data. We conclude with a discussion of our evidence vis-à-vis theoretical hypotheses.
The evolution of the computer software industry
The computer software and services sector (CSS) emerged within the computer manufacturing industry, from which it progressively detached itself. The emergence of the present-day industry occurred in the United States through different stages. 1 During the period around 1980-1994, the CSS grew by 20% a year to become one of the largest world industries. The global packaged software industry was estimated to be worth around US$ 250 billion in 2007. 2 The USA still dominates 50% of this industry. For example, Microsoft leads the operating system (OS) and office niches, while Oracle and SAP compete to dominate the enterprise segments under pressure from the world's largest, IBM and Microsoft. Even as new niches form, consolidation is ongoing, with companies specialized in particular niches entering different segments occupied by other firms. Table 1 gives an idea of the size of the industry.
The globalization of software production
The outsourcing phenomenon started in the beginning of the software "maturationphase;" outsourcing was first applied to software services, followed by software products themselves. 3 International offshoring is integrating independent 1
In the first era (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) independent service firms appeared to provide programs that IBM and other hardware vendors did not already sell embedded in their mainframes (Campbell-Kelly, 2004) . Software has evolved with the advent of various computing platforms, from the mainframe to the minicomputer, then the personal computer, the networked environment, and most recently, the era of the Internet and Intranet. Today, the computer software industry is usually presented as being composed of some 27 niches. In terms of employment or sales, the most important activities are software publishing, systems design, systems integration, custom computer programming, and data processing.
companies of developing countries such as India and China into global value chains.
Outsourcing is becoming more frequent as software becomes more complex, and cost becomes an increasing factor in production. Outsourcing is also facilitated by the increasing modularization of software, and by the spread of knowledge in software development processes. The outsourcing trend first created a need for substantial amounts of human capital in the outsourcing provider countries. As first India, then other developing countries entered these markets, scaling up both firm sizes as well as project sizes became a critical goal. 4 This resulted in the first Indian multinationals-mega-firms that rival some of the largest US software service firms in size. Software has also been a vanguard for the internationalization of service outsourcing, especially IT-enabled services such as business process outsourcing, R&D services and so on. The case of India serves as a benchmark for all others, as India was a first mover, and still has the largest and most developed software industry amongst developing countries. However, whereas the Indian industry largely grew on the basis of exports, the Chinese software industry initially started with products and services for the domestic market. Since the early 2000s, as the potential for outsourcing asserted itself, new Chinese entrants appeared, some initially servicing multinational needs in the Chinese domestic market, while others entered regional markets, primarily Japan. Thus, the two cases provide a contrast not only in terms of initial starting points for internationalization, but also in terms of their recent strategies. (Amounts in US$ billions) Source: IDC, NASSCOM, according to TCS, 2007-8 Annual Report, p. 55. 4 However, there are clearer signals now that the countries most successful at developing outsourcing sectors have actually benefited from age-old public policies and, at the same time, fewer investments are needed in this sector (i.e., fixed costs are lower). However, public support for higher education and human capital continues to be important in this sector as with prior ones.
The strategies of Chinese and Indian software multinationals
271
In order to grasp the internationalization of LDC firms, we have to understand a few factors: (i) the entry mode of the firms-greenfield 5 or acquisition; (ii) the market-orientation-export or domestic; and (iii) the nature of growth-in capabilities and other dimensions. At the same time, we need to understand the LDC setting, i.e., its resource base and position in the international value chain. We first summarize the major features of internationalization for our two cases:
While some Chinese outsourcing firms have focused on the domestic market serving foreign multinational clients, and others on the foreign market, both types serve foreign MNE needs. In this sense, both Chinese and Indian firms are "outsourcing-oriented" as well as internationalized.
India's industry was a "leader" in international outsourcing, and China a less mature follower. This has necessitated Chinese firms to search for less prospected markets, and markets where they are, by language, more culturally suited for servicing.
We can generalize by saying that the industries of both countries have found more easily accessed and less contested markets. Thus, market orientation (domestic or foreign) is a function of the relative competitiveness of the firms, as well as the opportunities present.
"Greenfield" subsidiaries have been the dominant entry mode for firms of both countries, largely because of their limited financial resources and low starting capabilities; however, both the leading Indian and Chinese software multinationals have recently engaged in acquisitions, for both market-and asset-seeking reasons.
We will begin with a review of the literature on internationalization, and what is known of developing country software industries. We will follow with our methodological approach in Section 3, the two country industry cases in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, and a discussion of their implications for our hypotheses in Section 6.
Theories of internationalization and software outsourcing
Multinational enterprises have been the subject of a multifarious literature. In this section, we draw on selected major perspectives to construct hypotheses about the occurrence of outsourcing in the software services sector, with an eye to using these hypotheses to guide the interpretation of our data.
Product life cycles and the relocation of industry to emerging economies
In the PLC perspective, new industries are born in the richest countries, most often under the aegis of an innovative company (Vernon, 1966) . The first countries to 5 A form of foreign direct investment where a parent company starts a new venture in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities from the ground up. develop industries generally produce for their own domestic markets, and then export. This is true for the by now advanced economies. In a final stage of this phase, a trend towards dominant designs, process standardization and cost reduction starts to assert itself. In a later phase, a shake-up occurs and the industry moves to developing countries. Third-world multinationals emerge (Wells, 1983) which nurture ownership advantages such as "appropriate technology," i.e., software better suited to poorer markets, and organizational advantages such as better capability to hire and train workers from LDCs. Lall (1983) points out that the "ownership advantages" of developing countries, such as lower cost inputs, can matter greatly. This is typically the issue in outsourcing, with the more recent cases being the Asian latecomer countries in electronics, as well as India's software industry. The literature on Indian software outsourcing often cites the huge opportunities that the country's lower wages presented, while non-resident Indians facilitated contacts with potential clients in the intended markets (Kapur and Ramamurthi, 2001; Kapur and McHale, 2005) . With these advantages, firms that started in the domestic market tended to have greater success in the international market.
Resources and initial opportunities of Chinese and Indian software firms
LDC new firms are generally more resource-constrained, given their country's latecomer status and lower revenues, and have lower capability (Lall, 1983) . Their motivations for internationalizing can be divided into market-and asset-seeking (Dunning, 1998) . A reduced domestic market and low labor costs, making LDC firms competitive abroad, are the central elements of the market-seeking explanation. Software outsourcing firms with ownership and labor advantages will seek initial opportunities in markets where their limited resources and labor costs can be efficiently and favorably employed in competition to address potential clients' needs.
Additionally, the most important factor dictating entry mode is the early resource condition of the outsourcing firm, and the knowledge base or capability required for it to operate. Indian software outsourcing firms started up and expanded early with limited resources, and so have had to offer work for payment, and to grow through retained earnings. Furthermore, software service firms do not have strategic intellectual property. These past experiences and the existing evidence from India's software industry suggest that at least the largest software firms have tended to grow through self-financing (Athreye, 2005a: 28) . This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Software outsourcing firms with limited assets and intellectual property will tend to grow via greenfield through investments or retained earnings from services, rather than via acquisitions. Several theories predict that the market orientation of a firm is based on cultural similarity. New firms start in their home (domestic) markets, and often choose culturally similar locations for their exports and foreign direct investments (FDI) in order to communicate with customers at a lower cost, and manage investments better (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) . In the value chain, the communications aspect is presumably even more important since the outsourcing firm has to relate to the client on a continuous "provider" basis, and not simply through a market transaction. When this is coupled with the "weak" financial resource base assumption, we arrive at the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: As software outsourcing firms with a limited financial resource base internationalize, they will enter markets where cultural differences, primarily language dissimilarities, are mitigated, or where markets are less contested by multinational incumbents.
Foreign direct investments and location choice of LDC MNEs: the synthetic approach
Dunning's ownership, location and internationalization (OLI) approach suggests that location-specific factors including natural resources, cheap labor, market size, as well as "institutional" factors (e.g., intellectual property regulation, R&D incentives) may present different advantages to different industries (Dunning, 1988 (Dunning, , 1998 . If these observations apply to developing country MNEs, we would expect the following hypotheses on market-seeking FDI:
Hypothesis 3: Software outsourcing FDI from the developing countries will follow existing patterns of export to the largest and more affluent markets for those developing countries. Thus, both Indian and Chinese MNEs will invest in North America and Western Europe, and Chinese firms will also invest in Japan.
At the same time, it is possible that these firms will enter other developing countries should they require additional manpower, or if their current capabilities have an advantage over their target markets. The preferred mode of entry would depend on whether the resources are similar to existing ones, and whether acclimatization is based on training:
Hypothesis 4: Software outsourcing firms will invest in other developing countries, in order to access new labor pools when their home labor supply becomes scarce or costly, as well as to exploit their organizational and technological advantages in similar markets. 2.5 The evolutionary approach to MNEs and the search for knowledge assets Asset-seeking is the second major reason that motivates MNEs to internationalize (Dunning, 1998) . The rationale for acquiring knowledge assets is perhaps even more critical for sectors depending largely on R&D, such as software. Zander's (1993, 2003) theory of the knowledge-based MNE argues that companies differ in the quality and quantity of the stocks of knowledge they possess, and will thus follow different strategies based on a range of competencies, strategies and structures.
6 For Kogut and Zander, MNEs produce knowledge and search for new and complementary knowledge, both in their domestic and international markets. Buckley et al. (2007) found that Chinese firms moved away from market-seeking motives to natural resource-seeking ones over time. Asset-seeking is related to firms' continuing competitiveness as they grow, that is, how firms improve their capability. We know that software firms seek to upgrade their capabilities at all times (Athreye, 2005b ), but at the same time, this means that they also have incomplete knowledge assets, some of which they may not be able to build up easily internally. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Software outsourcing firms will obtain strategic knowledge assets by acquisition. This could be done in either their home market or other countries, depending on how the assets are also tied to market-seeking strategies.
It is worth noting that the literature also accepts a second source of knowledge improvement: foreign multinational enterprises may also provide demonstration effects and learning opportunities to LDC firms (Meyer, 2004) ; this suggests that software outsourcing firms' capability can grow through their foreign clients. A third source is the firms themselves. They are also known to engage in the selfdevelopment of capability once they have reached a mature stage, as was the case with the major Indian software firms in the early 2000s (Athreye, 2005b) .
Research Approach
We will now briefly describe our data and the approach used to structure the data so as to test the hypotheses. We utilize a combination of primary and secondary data in order to bring out an understanding of the developmental processes and paths based on the experiences of individual firms. Our analysis is based on interviews conducted at various sites in India and China between 2001 and 2007, on secondary data, and 6 Their work is itself based on the work of Winter (1986 Winter ( /2006 and Nelson (1991) . Kogut and Zander also built on the dynamic capabilities approach, which emerged from the landmark work by Nelson and Winter and was eventually formalized by colleagues (1994, 1997) . In their view, "knowledge and learning are at the root of understanding how competitive advantage is gained and sustained" (Foss and Pedersen, 2004: 342) . Also, a high proportion of knowledge is tacit, embodied in human experience, and circulates within the MNE through its personnel. The Indian software sector has been extensively analysed, and it is well known that many Indian companies started their development as subcontractors or "providers" to MNEs based in developed countries (Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Athreye, 2002; Athreye, 2005a; Joseph, 2006) . While software exports from India started in the 1980s, the real take-off occurred in the 1990s: from $105 million in 1989, exports attained $6.2 billion in 2000, and around $32 billion in 2007, growing by over 30% a year. The industry's target is $60 billion in software exports by 2010. In 2007, software services represent over 22% of total Indian exports ($140 billion) and are its main export item. India has become by far the largest software exporter among LDCs, and trails behind only the USA and Ireland in the world. Most exporting firms are Indian-owned and controlled corporations; their size and export revenues are shown in Table 2 . 4.2 The Rise of India: capabilities meet opportunity early on
The growth of software industries in developing countries has been associated with the availability of highly skilled but low-cost labor, the technical capabilities of indigenous firms, and market opportunity (Arora and Gambardella, 2005) . One of the commonly cited factors in India's growth has been its comparative advantage in low-cost English-speaking programmers and engineers (Athreye, 2005a) . The opportunity was set for India by the increasing software outsourcing requirements of 7 Approximately 27 firms were interviewed in India, and well over 30 firms have been interviewed in China, including eight in the latter that were outsourcing-specific. All the interviews were conducted between 2001 and 2007. 8 The firms interviewed were: Isoftstone, BeyondSoft, WorkSoft, ChongRan, United Innovation, Symbio, Hexin, Objectiva, and Ufida. ChongRan (or CS&S) is a more diversified, formerly government-owned firm which was interviewed earlier, and which is included for comparison purposes. The three firms that this article focuses on, Beyondsoft, Worksoft and Isoftstone, rank among the top 13 outsourcing providers.
developed countries-which resulted from an ever greater need to deal with software complexity and costs. While the scale of the work (and the workforces) both increased gradually throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the defining opportunity was the year 2000 ("Y2K") problem, which required many US, European and other MNEs to rework older software prior to the arrival of Y2K. Even after the Y2K issue, the outsourcing contracts that firms gained continued to become progressively larger and more complex (Athreye, 2005b) , driving further increases in scale and scope, to the point where each major Indian software firm is now organized into as many as a dozen "verticals" or industrial sectors. As far as capability was concerned, although the firms started out small and relatively weak in capability, there was little competition for the low-cost teams of programmers sent to operate out of US clients' locations, presenting the notion of "low value-added" work with which the industry was earlier synonymous (Arora et al., 2001) . These teams learnt through interaction on the job with clients, with training later becoming more formalized. This "onsite" Source: NASSCOM, as compiled by Balakrishnan (2006) , and completed.
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4.3 Market-seeking behavior in developing and other "non-familiar" regions 4.3.1 Finding new service opportunities: from the USA to other developing regions With the reduction of "easy" opportunities in the primary markets of Indian firms, a more recent trend has been their entry into other geographic regions. Wipro has been in Japan for some years, and many Indian majors are establishing themselves in China, with Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) perhaps having the most significant presence. TCS, the largest Indian software firm, has perhaps the most developed multinational strategy in LDCs. TCS has also developed a large Latin American focus (see acquisitions in Table 3 ). 10 By mid-2007, there were 5000 TCS employees in the region, including 800 in Uruguay and 3600 in Brazil and Chile. 4.3.2 Opportunity for product firms: banking on less-contested markets Whereas the staple of most LDC software firms is service outsourcing, product development is an often-mentioned benchmark-one associated with higher (potential) returns and risk than service outsourcing work. The own brand product strategy has the potential not only for the highest profit margins of all, but is also the most risky (Athreye, 2005a) . Given the higher margins that service work obtains for multinational clients of developed regions, Indian software outsourcing firms have historically been reluctant to get heavily into software products. The I-Flex case, however, clearly shows how product strategy can work. 12 I-Flex was founded in 1991 as a joint venture with Citicorp, with its earlier incarnation 10 The Hindu, June 20, 2006. 11 Late in 2007, TCS was creating a centre in Guadalajara, Mexico, that will hire out 500 professionals in the short term to deliver a $400 million contract to the Social Security System of Mexico. In all, by early 2008, TCS had over 100,000 employees in 47 countries with revenues of $4.3 billion in the fiscal year of 2007 (Table 3) .
12
Because of the low probability of success in own brand products, many Indian firms are moving into product development in a more measured way, often via the development of products as a service, or the "co-development of products" (i.e., working on behalf of a client). Such activities do not carry the risk of making one's own brand product for the international marketplace. Examples of development for other product vendors include Tata Consultancy Services' development of a popular product for Microsoft, called Quadrem, an electronic marketplace, Brainvisa in e-learning, Subex in fraud telecommunications software, and Hexaware in human resources software. The upgrading of technology capability in order to perform this advanced work is accomplished through different channels, not the least being by the acquisition of foreign firms (and their capability and presence in markets). Another area is the domestic market for products. NASSCOM recently observed that the Indian market for IT hardware and software could be as large as US15.9 billion, having grown by 29% in 2006. 
Capability building: from organic growth to acquisition
Since the early 2000s, Indian firms have been moving up the value chain, in part driven by the natural needs of their clients (Arora et al., 2001) , and in part by the Indian firms' desire to upgrade themselves. Large firms like Infosys also face problems when trying to move into the higher value end of the software value chain, in part because clients are unwilling to relinquish the highest ends of the work to their contractors, and because of their lack of such higher level skills. 13 To confront such problems of "upgrading," established software service giants as well as pure product firms have adopted a notable shift in strategy, including the use of acquisitions to complement their previously dominant strategy of organic growth. The largest companies, including TCS, Infosys, and Wipro have been actively acquiring smaller companies, as have companies such as Mindtree in the second tier and even product firms like I-Flex. 14 To see how the industry has come to this point, it is worth considering the choices that firms face in building new competencies 13 Infosys annual reports, various years. Systems integration is one of the most complex tasks, one in which US firms like EDS, Accenture, and IBM have a commanding market share. Indian firms, in contrast, have found it more difficult to move into this sphere of work.
14 For instance, in 2006, I-Flex acquired Mantas, a US-based software company, for about US$122 million. Historically, the greenfield growth mode was most dominant in Infosys-one of the most conservative users of "war chests" in the industry. Recently however, following the pattern initially 280 over time. After the initial phase of technological learning from clients, such firms have faced the choice of either growing capability organically, or obtaining it via acquisition. In this manner, Indian software service companies have targeted firms in developed markets, typically buying foreign companies with specific expertise.
As our data for Indian and Chinese firms indicate, acquisition serves three purposes: (i) new domains, or the growth of a new internal division based on another new industry, i.e., a "vertical;" (ii) functional: to gain access to new functional or technological expertise; and (iii) market penetration: to create a "beachhead" in another country for delivery of services and products on site to that market. Table 3 shows a list of acquisitions for the top three Indian firms classified with this typology where possible. It appears that Wipro has been particularly aggressive in acquisitions, and TCS in foreign market expansion. Since many of their acquisition targets are in developed country markets, these are also intended to serve as "bases" to help the Indian MNEs to operate in those markets. Their acquisition ability is enabled by the higher market capitalization of Indian companies relative to their targets.
The Chinese software sector
In contrast to India, Chinese software firms initially followed a domestic path but this strategy has not precluded moves to outsourcing as either export or internal market clients. Also, the "follower" status and lower resource levels of Chinese compared to Indian firms meant that they have had to enter into markets that were weakly contested.
From products and early services to outsourcing
In the early stage of the industry up to 2001, many Chinese software firms attempted to work on a product model sometimes involving a basic application for a few customers, or a systems integration model. By the end of this period, the systems integrators were already reaching the limits of their rudimentary capability, whereas the better product firms were thriving in the domestic market.
15 Despite this success, most Chinese firms making products for the domestic market have not diversified into regional or international markets. The road for product companies has also been generally hard because of a variety of reasons, including a lack of customer IT maturity, fragmented markets, and intense competition at the low end from low-cost set by Wipro and since then also adopted by other firms, Infosys has used acquisitions to acquire competencies. 15 By working in their domestic market, Chinese firms have had some successes with products, including in enterprise management software (e.g., Kingdee and UFIDA), language translation and office productivity software (e.g., Kingsoft), middleware (e.g., Tongtech), and Linux operating systems (e.g., Red Flag software). 19 The challenge of growing this market was initially an issue of seeking opportunities that barely existed. One way was to focus on the Japanese outsourcing market, and a second was to target China's own internal market. Outsourcing in the form of exports of software services was already underway in China by 2001, but in the beginning, firms were mainly focused on the Japanese market. In 2006, China's software outsourcing markets included Japan (61%), the USA (21.8%), Europe (4.7%), and others (12.5%). The Japanese market accounted for US$872 million.
20
The Chinese market grew fourfold between 2003 and 2007, as shown in Table 4 , thus justifying the domestic market orientation of most Chinese firms. Table 5 illustrates the fact that China's largest firms are oriented towards Japanese or US clients. However, the largest of these firms are dwarfed by the largest Indian firms, and most are even smaller than the smallest of the Indian firms in Table 2 . 16 Piracy is one of the problems that afflict product firms. One well-known product company that we interviewed noted that their well-known product was so heavily pirated that it became a money loser, and it was only the government stepping in to purchase their software in procurement contracts which helped to save this line of business for them.
17
One of the largest systems integrators interviewed earlier admitted that profits were quite low, and in fact, there have also been recent reports of other systems integrators suffering from low margins (Tschang and Xue, 2005) . According to one interviewee, they may also have difficulty in trying to upgrade operations along the value chain.
18
According to an official, the margins from outsourcing were in the 30% range for the more successful Chinese firms, mirroring margins from India, as opposed to being in the order of 10% or less-as product and systems integration companies have experienced. The outsourcers have ostensibly avoided trying to make products or to undertake systems integration work.
19
Statistics are from the International Data Corporation (http://www.idc.com/). These numbers are generally beyond the 30% growth rates that Indian firms were averaging in the 1990s.
20
Source: http://www.ccid.com/. In another report, the Japanese market accounted for 59% of China's outsourcing revenue, compared to the US market's 23%. Data from Analysiys (http:// www.analysys.com/). 
Entering the Japanese market
The size of the Japanese market, and its attraction for Chinese firms that want to sell services offshore, illustrates a similarity to the USA-India situation in its early days. Chinese firms were initially called on to do lower value work for Japanese clients. Many Chinese firms seek to imitate the success of Neusoft, a firm that achieved the strongest export performance by servicing the Japanese market. Other firms have come up in the ranks. Japanese systems integrators are their main clients-these occupy the same market niches in Japan as do US systems integrators like Accenture and EDS for the US market. One of the issues that Chinese firms have reported in dealing with Japanese clients is the greater degree of control and specificity that is required by these clients. More recently, a number of software firms have also focused on BPO, in particular to the Japanese and Korean markets.
Most of the outsourcing firms that have succeeded in the Japanese market started independently of other service and product firms, suggesting that the necessary competencies were completely different. Furthermore, not all the few earlier firms that tried to move into software outsourcing have been successful, again suggesting that prior competencies might hold one back. This pattern is similar to the early experiences of Indian service firms that tried to move from services into products.
The Chinese domestic market: servicing western MNEs
In recent years, another new set of outsourcing providers has emerged in China. This new breed of firms works with foreign, primarily Western, multinationals that service the Chinese domestic market. These foreign MNEs have been strong in the higher end product and service software sector in China; these include firms such as Microsoft, Oracle, and BEA, and software services and systems integration companies like IBM and Accenture. Many foreign, typically US MNEs suffer from a location disadvantage in sourcing labor and accessing clients when trying to service the Chinese market. Interpersonal relationships or "guanxi" are as vital to conducting business in the Chinese software sector as in other sectors (Saxenian, 2005) . The difficulty of entering the Chinese market may also be due to differences in **Total number of employees, including outsourcing. The outsourcing division alone reports 4000 or more employees. ***Subsidiaries within this holding company hold varying CMM levels between 2 and 3. The strategies of Chinese and Indian software multinationals standards, administrative rules and programmes across regions and cities. 21 In this environment, MNEs have a greater need to "localize" products and content. However, many Chinese companies did not have the capability to do higher end services like systems consulting and design, although it was easier for them to develop lower level work like localization, customization and systems integration. This set of circumstances has enabled a convenient marriage between outsourcing foreign software MNEs and supplier domestic firms.
The new Chinese outsourcing firms
As noted earlier, the recent Chinese outsourcing pattern has involved firms closely connected to foreign markets, or to MNEs operating in China. 22 While Chinese firms had a limited capability early on, they have circumvented such limitations by working on lower value-added services. 23 A typical case is BeyondSoft, which started localizing and testing products for MNEs entering the Chinese market, including all Microsoft products in China, and HP products for Asia. Gradually, it has worked its way up into higher-level work, including managing offshore development centres for clients, learning organizational strategies from Indian companies and Western clients alike. Over time, the company has managed to develop capabilities in application development and maintenance, and to service more global work of MNEs. There are also at least three markets-corporate, government, and private. However, the governmental market is strongly bound by policy and regulations, and many software and systems contracts in the past supported domestic firms. Furthermore, at least in the past, it has been difficult to sell services to some Chinese corporate customers.
22
The origins of the recent rapidly growing outsourcing domestic firms that service MNEs in the domestic economy are largely private, and hardly any appear to have been government-owned or to have involved government investments.
23
Since then, many Chinese software firms had until a couple of years ago been slowly climbing the organizational "process maturity" curve, with the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) capability maturity model (CMM) level 3 or ISO 9000 certification being common to many of them. As of 2007, only about seven firms had reached CMM level 5-the highest certification-and not all of them were of significant size or reputation (relative to the rest of the Chinese industry). This contrasted with Indian firms, where many (over 50 as recently as a few years ago) had achieved CMM level 5.
24
At one point, they were trying different strategies, such as opening up dedicated offshore development centers for MNE clients, as well as exploring joint ventures with Indian outsourcing providers.
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but Worksoft has focused far more than other firms on offshore development centres, and has a larger number of US clients. Like the Indian firms, Chinese firms are also building capability through interaction with MNEs, and in recognition of India's prowess, they increasingly seek to learn from the Indian experience.
The strategy of rapid scale-up and diversification
Since the early 2000s, Chinese outsourcing firms have sought to scale up rapidly, initially by hiring and training fresh graduates, but more recently, by engaging in targeted acquisitions in order to compete for larger contracts from MNEs. There was a strong sense that Chinese firms could not compete with Indian firms in terms of scale and capability. Unlike some Indian firms, most of the Chinese firms' clients appear to be the independent software vendors (ISVs) themselves-these can demonstrate a greater tendency to keep the highest value work to themselves than end user clients would. Chinese firms may have had a difficult time "crossing the chasm" between carrying out application development for ISVs and working on services for the ISVs' clients. In contrast, many clients of the Indian software firms are actually end users of vendor software, where software is not part of the end users' core business, and therefore, may be more amenable to outsourcing. While starting out with servicing the domestic market, some Chinese outsourcing firms are now beginning to do work for the same foreign MNEs on a worldwide basis. While this work still tends to be consigned to a lower value added, it proves that at least in software, starting from a domestic market does not limit a firm from eventually servicing the same clients on international projects.
The speed with which the outsourcing industry grows under a globally competitive environment requires a rapid expansion strategy for scaling up human resources for individual firms. Many Chinese outsourcing firms are concerned with their smaller scale, when compared to Indian equivalents. Most of these firms were growing at rates as high as 50% per year by the mid-2000s, and that was mostly for servicing foreign MNEs in the domestic market. Despite this, as of 2006, only five firms had over 2000 employees, with the largest, Neusoft, having 4000 staff members. The situation had changed by 2008, with Beyondsoft, Worksoft and Isoftstone having 4000 employees or more. In contrast, the largest Indian firms like Infosys, TCS, and Wipro are at least ten times larger in size. While there appears to be sufficient human capital to service the Chinese industry's needs, firms have a difficult time when they 25 Another secondary strategy is to focus on niche markets, which some of the smaller firms have done. Examples include Objectiva (a software developer for the document-processing industry), which was eventually acquired by one of its clients, and Symbio which operates at the higher value end of the market.
The strategies of Chinese and Indian software multinationals consider potential employees for proficiency in English or other foreign languages, process capability, and other skills. Firms have approached this scaling up in two ways. The first has been to open up development centres in so-called second tier cities, hiring university graduates at lower wages than in Beijing or other high-wage centres. Secondly, many Chinese outsourcing firms are adopting an acquisitions strategy and are acquiring firms earlier than Indian firms did: Chinese companies have acquired other firms when they were well below the 10,000 employee mark, which is the stage that most Indian firms started their acquisitions.
As shown in Table 6 , all three firms that we profiled earlier recently became more aggressive in their acquisitions. Other outsourcing firms, such as Neusoft, Chinasoft, and Longpro, are also creating subsidiaries abroad in order to be close to their outsourcing clients, or acquiring firms to scale up faster. We have classified acquisitions into the three categories used for the Indian case: functional, market-penetrating and new domain-oriented. All three firms are targeting a variety of these three aims with their acquisitions, that is, a wide range of strategic assets and interests are under consideration, along with the general desire to grow bigger, not only by organic growth, but by acquisition, and to be "market-seeking." Thus, Beyondsoft recognized the need to scale up as well as to develop new capabilities, and new lines of business by acquisitions. In 2006, they acquired an ERP solutions provider in India, and in 2007, a Chinese IT consultancy and banking domain solutions provider. The stated intent of acquiring the Indian firm was to obtain Indian expertise in developing systems as well as in software development processes-two areas in which they considered themselves weaker.
At the same time, while the diversity of purposes exhibited by the acquisitions suggests the intention to complement incomplete portfolios of capabilities, there are indications from particular acquisitions of a specific strategy. For instance, while Beyondsoft is reinforcing its local base of developers as well as seeking to learn from Indian capabilities, Worksoft is seeking to penetrate a new market by establishing "beachheads" in the USA, and Isoftstone is diversifying geographically. It is worth noting that many of these outsourcing firms staff their management with Chinese, or overseas Chinese, employees who have international experience and are fluent in English. This has been augmented in recent years by the return of a number of Chinese with valuable experience from Silicon Valley. Finally, in recognition of the growth potential of outsourcing, both national and regional government policies have sought to aid firms' efforts to internationalize, and to scale up their work forces. One of the most important problems that US-active Chinese firms have to confront is the need to have stronger language skills and appropriate cultural backgrounds to engage with Western clients. 5.4.1 Product firms moving to sell abroad While the model for internationalization has been proved by product companies in other sectors, such as Haier for white goods, and Lenovo for laptops, in software, some Chinese product software firms are also moving abroad. These already include lead product makers in the domestic market, such as China National Software & Service Company, Kingdee and Ufida. These have started creating subsidiaries to serve customers of their enterprise management software in parts of South-East Asia.
Discussion and implications for theory
We will now return to the five main hypotheses.
6.1 Initial start-up and entry mode: support for hypotheses 1 and 2
Indian firms have grown by retained earnings (hypothesis 1), and have tended to enter new markets with "greenfield," albeit often mostly sales, offices.
The strategies of Chinese and Indian software multinationals However, recently they have been acquiring firms with the purpose of incorporating new knowledge as well as a variety of products.
Hypothesis 2 is about expansion in culturally similar environments. The hypothesis is strongly supported. By focusing on the USA, Indian firms are mainly targeting "culturally similar" markets, i.e., markets where the English language is dominant, and the largest and most lucrative markets (hypothesis 3). To some degree, these larger, developed markets are also the most mature and ready to outsource services. Chinese firms did the same with the Japanese market.
The third hypothesis concerns outsourcing to affluent countries that were early entrants in the PLC. This hypothesis is also supported. Indian firms are outsourcing providers to North America and Western Europe, and Chinese firms to Japanese systems integrators. Our hypothesis tends to integrate the issue of outsourcing in the product and industry life-cycle approach.
Hypothesis 4 concerns the behavior of third world multinationals vis-à-vis other developing countries. As predicted by Wells Jr. (1983) , both Indian and Chinese MNEs are now looking for new markets in other LDCs for their scanty products. In addition, Indian firms are looking for cheap labor in other Asian and Latin American countries.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are about how firms internationalize to markets in terms of FDI. As pointed out in hypothesis 1, Indian firms invest in "offices" or "beachheads" in North America and Western Europe, where they export the majority of their services. Chinese firms do not seem to be entering Japan or the USA in the same way. Thus, hypothesis 3 is only validated for India, possibly because of the protected nature of the Japanese market-with Japanese systems integrators controlling access. As far as hypothesis 4 is concerned, selected large Indian firms are also developing greenfield investments and acquiring subsidiaries in other developing countries to exploit their capabilities as software outsourcing and development centres, e.g., TCS is opening up larger facilities in Latin America and China for services. 26 This suggests that Indian firms are finding that investment also involves acquiring or building up subsidiaries in these regions. Again, this is likely to be due to the particularities of each market, which reflects not only cultural, but also regional and even local business practices. For India, the issue of continuing internationalization appears to involve entry into developing markets such as China and Latin America, supporting hypothesis 4. In contrast, Chinese firms have been more reluctant to enter new LDC markets, possibly because of their continuing need to first compete in their primary markets.
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In fact, some activities border on either confirming or unconfirming the hypothesis. For instance, while India's I-Flex has about 400 employees in its Singapore offices servicing the region (according to the authors' research), it is not clear whether Singapore should be considered as a "developing" region as far as financial software product development is concerned, or as an advanced market where advanced skills are available to be invested in acquisition. Finally, in relation to hypothesis 5, Indian firms more clearly, but also some of the largest Chinese firms, are increasing their strategic knowledge assets abroad. We have identified the search for strategic assets in our data. Again, according to our "stages model," this search occurs at middle and late stages of maturity, which the largest Chinese and Indian firms are reaching. Constraints on strategic assets in the cases of both China and India, and more basic resource constraints in the process of rapid growth in the case of China, are handled through acquisitions. The other strategy of growing resources-hiring and training-is permanently ongoing. Being followers to the international marketplace, Chinese firms feel the competition more keenly when they venture out of China, and are thus under pressure to acquire strategic assets at earlier stages of their development. That acquisition is important to both India and China suggests that resources cannot be easily or rapidly upgraded. In general, it might be said that as Chinese firms scale up and enter into "international" competition, often to work for the same MNE clients as before, these Chinese outsourcing firms also face the general difficulty of upgrading to "high value" work, an obstacle which Indian firms faced.
Conclusions
While Chinese and Indian software industries were previously known to be following two different paths, domestic versus export sales (Tschang and Xue, 2005) , we have identified a new outsourcing trend in the Chinese industry's story. We have also sought to reformulate-and integrate-existing theory to explain the differences between the Chinese and Indian cases. Parts of the two countries' industries are converging on one another as they continue to diversify and increase value-added activities. It might be noted that further convergence seems to be occurring, as Indian firms have recently also been looking at their domestic market.
We find general confirmation for the PLC-ILC as well as the OLI approaches. Cultural factors also explain some contours of internationalization of LDC firms and asset exploitation versus asset acquisition is also useful and receives support. However, our story is more complex because we have managed to integrate outsourcing processes in the internationalization of third-world multinationals.
Our study also suggests that even as we test for general high-level theories at a country level, it is important to bear in mind the complexity of the individual firm's experience. While a loose, staged process can be said to be at work, there is no universal path among LDCs to nurture an outsourcing industry. The competitive landscape is always dynamic and LDC firms are always situated in idiosyncratic contexts as a result of the firms' time of entry, existing competition, and opportunities available. This requires strategizing across these factors in order to achieve the firms' goals. Given this evidence from the Indian and Chinese software industries, we may also conclude that the PLC-OLI theory draws a useful but sketchy
The strategies of Chinese and Indian software multinationals picture of the sector's evolution. Analysing the substrate of a sector at a deeper level of institutional detail provides nuances for both propositions and prescriptions alike. 27 Finally, the largest firms in both countries are, in spite of their differences, engaged in a persistent pattern of moving up within the international value chain towards higher value-added segments. This is a challenging strategy, and requires them to shift from greenfield investments to acquisitions. That acquisitions are required for multiple, interrelated reasons further suggests that the process of internationalizing is complex and path-dependent.
